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RETIRING CORPORATE RETRIBUTION 
SAMUEL W. BUELL* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
As unlikely as it might seem, the large literature on the theory of corporate 
criminal liability appears to have insufficiently attended to an important point. In 
the endless debates about the purposes of corporate criminal liability, it has been 
overlooked that corporations cannot be retributively punished. 
This is a more particular point, with specific implications, than the familiar 
and blunter claim that the application of criminal law to corporations is simply 
nonsensical in terms of punishment theory’s concern with moral responsibility 
because legal entities are not people.1 To the contrary, corporations can be 
blameworthy, that is, they can do things that provide retributive justification for 
punishment. Corporations also can be punished. The problem arises at the last 
step of the analysis: Corporations cannot be punished retributively. This point, I 
will claim, is important to understanding how corporate criminal liability has 
developed and is practiced in contemporary legal systems. 
To set the table, there are several premises that can claim wide though not 
universal support. First, corporations act in the world, through the collective 
actions of their agents. Second, when corporations act (or, if one prefers, when 
they are the host or source for group actions), they sometimes generate risks and 
harms. Third, some such risks and harms are properly designated as culpable 
wrongs. 
Mainstream retributivist theory holds that wrongdoers should or must be 
punished because they deserve punishment on account of their wrongdoing.2 
Various lines of argument about what wrongdoers retributively deserve have 
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 1.  E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into 
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1981) (quoting Edward, First Baron 
Thurlow); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 320–21 (1996). 
 2.  Mitchell N. Berman, Modest Retributivism, in LEGAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S. MOORE 35, 37 (Kimberly Kessler Ferzan & Stephen J. Morse eds., 
2016); Mitchell N. Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 433, 433 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011) [hereinafter Berman, Two Kinds of 
Retributivism]; Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, 
AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987). 
For an example of an alternative “axiological” account of retributivism that critiques the more 
conventional deontic approach, see generally LEO ZAIBERT, RETHINKING PUNISHMENT (2018). 
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pointed to suffering, pain, “hard treatment,” a “set back to interests,” or a 
reduction in well-being as satisfying the retributive demand for acting upon 
desert.3 
Corporate retributivism founders here. As an empirical matter, only living 
things can suffer, experience pain, or endure “hard treatment.” Corporations 
might appear to be candidates for “setbacks to interests” or “reductions in well-
being,” but only if one defines these concepts in ways that unmoor them from the 
structure of retributive theory. Matters can go less well for a corporation as a 
result of things done to it, including by legal processes. But a mere “set back” to 
the economic prospects of a going concern cannot deliver a morally meaningful 
deprivation that  produces the good that retributivism demands in response to 
the moral wrong of a crime. Therefore, corporations cannot be objects of 
retributive punishment even if, as I and many others believe, corporations can be 
blameworthy.4 
Corporations easily can be punished. Legal process can do things to 
corporations that are costly and influential, which may cause corporations, 
through their agents, to change how they act. Thus, the literature is brimming 
with consequentialist arguments for corporate criminal liability and corporate 
punishment.5 But corporations cannot be retributively punished because they 
cannot be harmed or set back in ways that could satisfy the requirement to answer 
a wrong against persons with an equivalent or fitting deprivation against the 
wrongdoer. Even if it were possible to imprison a corporation, or flog it, or stop 
its heart, such a punishment could not be retributive. 
Punishment of corporations can, of course, cause people to suffer or endure 
setbacks that they might deserve. But individuals can deserve to be punished only 
in proportion to their own wrongdoing. One individual cannot be a justified 
retributive object on account of others’ wrongdoing simply because of a legal-
institutional relationship among them—as opposed, for example, to being 
responsible on account of the individual’s culpable complicity in the wrongdoing 
of others. And, of course, individuals affiliated with a corporation may deserve 
some blame if something goes wrong in the firm, even if their individual 
blameworthiness is insufficient to justify official punishment. 
Some argue for corporate retributivism on the grounds that (1) corporations 
can be blameworthy; (2) people believe that blameworthy corporations deserve 
 
 3.  See infra notes 23–43 and accompanying text. 
 4.  See, e.g., KIP SCHLEGEL, JUST DESERTS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINALS 75–90 (1990); Samuel 
W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 491–500 (2006) (including 
sources cited therein). 
 5.  See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis 
of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 692 (1997); Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially 
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 834 (1994); see also Reinier H. 
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 858 (1984); 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability 
for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (1982); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 
93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1231 (1984). 
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to be punished; so (3) corporations should be punished in order to deliver on a 
justified demand for corporate desert. These are obviously consequentialist 
arguments. If retribution against corporations cannot actually be achieved, 
corporate punishment must be delivering something else in response to the 
understandable demand for corporate desert. That something may be socially 
beneficial. But it is not retributive. 
While this argument, to be developed in what follows, echoes the aphorism 
that a corporation has “no soul to damn, no body to kick,”6 the old metaphor—
which has been deployed, often confusingly, to support a diversity of arguments 
about corporate punishment—does not capture the point. The state has many 
means by which to damn and kick corporations, that is, means by which to make 
a corporation’s affairs go less well in response to its conduct, including by 
damaging or even destroying a corporation’s identity or existence. Corporate 
punishment is no difficulty.7 
The problem is that a corporation, however much it may be affected by the 
damning and kicking, cannot be made to endure the punishment in a way that 
would count as retributive. For legal entities, pain, setbacks, suffering, hard 
treatment, and loss of well-being are only (ill-fitting) synonyms for losses. As with 
tangos, it takes two to retribute: For retribution to occur, it must be both 
delivered and received—and its receipt must occur in the requisite morally 
significant way, not through a solely instrumental process (one that applies 
measures to a subject designed to induce behavioral alterations). The apposite 
metaphor would perhaps be something far less felicitous, like “a corporation has 
no psyche at which to direct deprivation.” 
It follows that if corporations cannot receive retribution, there can be no 
retributive constraint on corporate punishment. Thus, any prohibitions on 
“unjust” corporate punishments must arise from either instrumental analysis or 
some other theory, perhaps one about fairness and procedural rights, establishing 
why it would be wrong to punish a corporation that did not engage in culpable 
wrongdoing. 
The developed form of this argument will, it is hoped, illuminate aspects of 
the contemporary corporate prosecution program in the United States, as 
administered by the Department of Justice (DOJ). Since 1999, the DOJ has 
published and pursued a thoroughgoingly instrumentalist program for imposing 
corporate criminal liability.8 In large part because of that program’s close focus 
 
 6.  See Eliezer Lederman, Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation: Rethinking a Complex 
Triangle, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 285, 309 (1985) (quoting R. CROSS & P. JONES, 
INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL LAW 122 (R. Card ed., 10th ed. 1984)). 
 7.  W. Robert Thomas, The Ability and Responsibility of Corporate Law to Improve Criminal Fines, 
78 OHIO ST. L.J. 601, 624 (2017) (“Corporations obviously can be harmed, and plausibly can experience 
harm: they can have their charters to exist revoked, their property seized, or their internal structures 
forcibly reworked in ways that severely impair the corporation from pursuing its goals.”); see SCHLEGEL, 
supra note 4, at 147–73. Thomas uses the word “experience,” but it is not clear whether he means 
something like “be affected by” or rather “feel.” 
 8.  U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual, § 9-28.000 (2018). 
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on questions of social welfare—and the manner in which social welfare analysis 
of corporate affairs tends to be conducted in the United States—prosecutors have 
developed a practice of commonly negotiating and settling with corporations.9 
Much of the public and the media has been dissatisfied with this corporate 
prosecution program, some intensely so.10 There are a variety of objections to the 
DOJ’s conduct, often including cogent suggestions for reform. But, among the 
voices of dissent, there is a common and simple theme that the government 
“keeps letting corporations off the hook,” and the like. 
This objection should not be surprising. Whether or not the DOJ is punishing 
corporations enough, and in the right ways, to achieve beneficial changes in 
corporate behavior, prosecutors are not delivering desert upon corporations—
because they could not do so even if that were their objective. In a simple way, 
this is true because the doctrine that federal prosecutors deploy against 
corporations, respondeat superior liability, imposes a broad form of agency 
liability on companies that requires no inquiry into corporate institutional fault. 
But the theoretical deficit in retributive corporate punishment, in a deeper way, 
means that corporate prosecutions cannot accomplish retributive punishment 
regardless of the applicable liability rule. 
A puzzle is thus partially illuminated. It has remained mysterious why 
corporate criminal liability is so attractive to both the public and officials even 
though the only remedy that criminal justice systems can impose on 
corporations—that American-style civil process cannot—is to convict them, that 
is, to declare them guilty of a crime.11 Indeed, a great deal of the unhappiness 
with the DOJ’s program is that prosecutors most often settle cases through 
deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements (DPAs and NPAs) that are 
said to coddle corporations because, in such deals, firms avoid criminal 
conviction. 
But why should a conviction by itself matter, given that it is only an entry on 
a court’s docket?12 Perhaps convictions matter because they are the most public 
and official way to say that a corporation deserves to be punished, even though 
 
 9.  See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE 
WITH CORPORATIONS (2014); Jennifer Arlen & Samuel W. Buell, The Law of Corporate Investigations 
and the Global Expansion of Corporate Criminal Enforcement, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 697 (2020). 
 10.  See, e.g., JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS 
TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES (2017); Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level 
Executives  Been  Prosecuted?,  N.Y.  REV.  BOOKS  (Jan.  9,  2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/ 
2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ [https://perma.cc/RYZ8-M7MK]; David M. 
Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1301 (2013); see also SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE 109–75 (2016) (assessing such claims in 
depth). 
 11.  See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1477, 1532 (1996) (arguing that corporate civil liability could replace corporate criminal liability). 
 12.  See Cindy R. Alexander & Jennifer Arlen, Does Conviction Matter? The Reputational and 
Collateral Effects of Corporate Crime, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND 
FINANCIAL MISDEALING 87, 91 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018) (finding that guilty pleas and deferred 
prosecution agreements impact firms similarly). 
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it cannot actually receive its desert in the form of a sentence. “We declare this 
group project worthy of blame even though, alas, we cannot make it endure 
retribution for its wrong.” Such a statement may be warranted and accurate, and 
may have useful effects. It is also an admission of the impossibility of corporate 
retribution. 
In the remainder of this Article these arguments are expanded, first by 
distinguishing several lines of retributive argument, then by applying those 
arguments to corporations, and finally by showing how common claims about 
what is often called corporate “retribution” actually serve the mainstream and 
dominant discussion of consequentialism, and particularly instrumentalism, in 
corporate punishment. 
II 
THE ARGUMENT FROM THEORY 
To claim that there can be no retributive punishment of corporations because 
non-persons (or “merely” legal persons) cannot be objects of retribution is, of 
course, conclusory. And an assertion such as that a corporation has “no soul to 
damn” is not grounded in modern retributive theory, which works with reason, 
not spiritual belief.  This Part summarizes the particular claims of retributive 
theory in order to set the stage for further examining the application of that 
theory to corporations. 
A. Retribution 
The simplest and most common way to state the theory of retribution, as a 
general justifying aim of the criminal law, is in terms of a moral imperative that 
wrongdoers deserve punishment on account of their wrongdoing.13 This major 
premise of retributivism can frustrate some because it seems so abrupt, even a 
touch circular. But the full-throated retributivist (sometimes termed the 
“positive” retributivist) does not see it that way. For her, the theory, at the level 
of first principle, is elegant for its simplicity and clarity. 
With the concession that the particulars of retributivist theory continue to be 
debated at enormous length, we might parse the major premise into three 
elements.14 First, there must be wrongdoing committed by a wrongdoer—
opening the way to rich debate about what moral wrongs are, and which ones 
warrant designation as crimes.15 Next is the question of why moral wrongdoing 
produces, in Joel Feinberg’s formulation, a “desert basis,” such that punishment 
of the wrongdoer should or must follow from her wrongdoing—and why the state 
 
 13.  See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 153–
59 (1997); Michael S. Moore, Justifying Retributivism, 27 ISR. L. REV. 15, 15 (1993). 
 14.  For a full and clear discussion of the main issues in retributive theory and the leading literatures, 
see Alec Walen, Retributive Justice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/justice-retributive/ [https://perma.cc/5998-BJ22]. 
 15.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 14 
(2008). 
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should be the one to impose it.16 Third is the question of what desert demands be 
done to the wrongdoer on account of her wrongdoing.17 
Across each of these three questions, the major premise holds. Retribution, 
when demanded, is pursued in order to fulfill a moral imperative—that the 
wrongdoer must be punished. Whether such punishment produces benefits or 
harms is irrelevant to a “pure” or “full-throated” retributive theory. One can 
style retributivism as a broadly consequentialist theory by including the good of 
satisfying retributivism’s moral imperative within the desirable products of 
punishment.18 But that is the only sense in which retributive theory can be said to 
look forward. 
For many, an entailment of retributive theory is what is commonly known as 
“negative” retributivism, sometimes referred to as retributivism’s “side 
constraint” on consequentialism.19 On this view, it is also (or instead) a moral 
imperative that wrongdoers never be punished in excess of their desert. Thus, no 
matter how great the social benefits of a given punishment might be, any 
imposition of such punishment on a non-wrongdoer is a prohibited moral wrong. 
To consider, at a categorical level, the application of retributive punishment 
to corporations, we need not grapple with the question of what may count as 
moral wrongdoing deserving of punishment. The present subject is punishment 
of corporations for any crime, not which actions, among all those a corporation 
might take, should be criminalized. 
Neither need we dwell on the question of why wrongdoing produces a desert 
demand—the fulcrum of retributive theory. The objective here is not to reargue 
the central claim of retributivism, but to assume it. If a corporation can be a 
wrongdoer, then retributivism demands that the state deliver desert to the 
corporation on account of its wrongdoing. To fail to pursue desert would be to 
defy retributivism’s command. Whether, for example, such desert is required in 
order to “balance the moral ledger,” simply because it is morally good to do what 
is morally required, or for some other reason, are debated matters of retributive 
theory that are not material to the question of whether corporations can be 
punished retributively.20 
What desert demands be done to the wrongdoer on account of her 
wrongdoing, however, is the central question in considering corporate 
 
 16.  JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 58 
(1970); David Dolinko, Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment, 16 
LAW & PHIL. 507, 508 (1997); Alon Harel, Why Only the State May Inflict Criminal Sanctions: The Case 
Against Privately Inflicted Sanctions, 14 LEGAL THEORY 113, 114 2008). 
 17.  See Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 825–42 
(2007). 
 18.  Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, supra note 2, at 339–40; see also Moore, supra note 13, at 
19 (“[W]hat is distinctively retributivist is the view that the guilty receiving their just deserts is an intrinsic 
good. It is, in other words, not an instrumental good.”). 
 19.  R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME & 
JUST. 1, 7 (1996). 
 20.  Id. at 26–28. 
02 - BUELL - RETIRING CORPORATE RETRIBUTION - AUTHOR PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 12/19/2020  11:47 AM 
No. 4 2020] RETIRING CORPORATE RETRIBUTION 31 
retribution. “Punishment” is not an easily defined term.21 It tends to represent a 
category of things more than a clearly specified concept. What counts as 
punishment depends on many things, not least the purpose or purposes for which 
the action denoted as punishment is carried out. In Joel Feinberg’s oft-quoted 
formulation, punishment is the unique coupling of official sanctions with official 
condemnation: “Punishment is a conventional device for the expression of 
attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and 
reprobation, either on the part of the punishing authority himself or those ‘in 
whose name’ the punishment is inflicted.”22 Of course, there can be no expression 
of condemnation without the infliction of the punishment that does the 
expressing. 
To say that retributivism demands that wrongdoers be punished on account 
of their wrongdoing invites the question of what it is that must be done to 
wrongdoers in order for it to be said that they have been punished. What is it 
exactly that wrongdoers deserve? 
A rough count would likely reveal the most common view in the modern 
literature to be that retribution requires the infliction of suffering.23 As Rawls put 
it, “It is morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion 
to his wrongdoing.”24 The terms “hard treatment” and “pain” are also sometimes 
used in addition to or in place of suffering.25 These ideas amount to the same 
thing: that to punish a person retributively is to set out to make her endure a 
treatment or process designed and intended to be difficult or unpleasant to 
endure. Since corporal punishment is not used in Anglo-American legal systems, 
these treatments now generally take the form of deprivations, most commonly 
deprivation of liberties and comforts. 
Along this line of retributive analysis, a debate that has followed has been 
described, in an oversimplification, as between “objectivists” and 
“subjectivists.”26 Objectivists, one might summarize, maintain that the desert 
 
 21.  See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 
405 (1958) (defining punishment as “unpleasant physical consequences” plus condemnation). 
 22.  Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 (1965). 
 23.  FEINBERG, supra note 16, at 67 (“It is an essential and intended element of punishment  .  .  . 
that the victim be made to suffer.”); Moore, supra note 13, at 21 (“[O]nly when harsh treatment is 
imposed on offenders in order to give them their just deserts does such harsh treatment constitute 
punishment.”); see also JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT 67 (1973); Berman, Two Kinds of 
Retributivism,  supra note 2, at 438; A.M. Quinton, On Punishment, 14 ANALYSIS 133, 136–37 (1954); 
Douglas N. Husak, Retribution in Criminal Theory, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959, 960 (2000). Some would 
substitute “pain” for suffering as the object of retribution, but this amounts to the same point. See NILS 
CHRISTIE, LIMITS TO PAIN 5 (1981); K.G. Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, 70 MIND 471, 473 
(1961) (defining punishment as “the deliberate infliction of pain”). 
 24.  John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955). 
 25.  For example, Schlegel, in a frequently cited monograph defending the idea of corporate 
retribution, says that corporations may be given “hard treatment” and “vary greatly in their capacity to 
endure hard treatment,” without argument as to how this vocabulary suits corporate subjects. SCHLEGEL, 
supra note 4, at 153 (emphasis added). 
 26.  See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment, 76 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1069 (2009) (arguing that retributivism needs to account for individual responses 
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demand is that the state carry out the required punishment, and that ends the 
matter. If the wrongdoer for some reason welcomes the punishment, is 
indifferent to it, or does not experience it, that does not negate retribution—as 
long as the punishment imposed is the one that retribution demands, and the 
wrongdoer at least has the capacity to be punished even if he does not in fact 
experience the punishment in the modally expected manner.27 
Subjectivists, on the other hand, maintain that retribution requires that the 
wrongdoer’s suffering or experience be the designed one in each instance of 
punishment. Indeed, some argue that an individual wrongdoer’s suffering is the 
essence of the punishment that retribution demands and that the state’s actions 
to bring about that suffering are not the punishment itself but rather its 
instrument.28 
Much of this debate has been concerned with whether it matters that people 
commonly experience equivalent punishments differently.29 For example, if 
suffering is what retribution demands in the way of punishment, should 
punishments be imposed, as in current practice, “objectively” in terms of, for 
example, years in prison, or “subjectively,” in terms of something like units of 
suffering, calculated according to the individual wrongdoer’s liability to suffer 
from a particular form of punishment. 
Some have described retribution as requiring a less overtly affective form of 
deprivation, such as a set-back to interests or well-being.30 As Mitchell Berman 
has put the point, desert demands (considerations of proportionality aside) that 
the wrongdoer’s life “go less well” as a consequence of her wrongdoing.31 Or, if 
one is concerned about the question of subjectivity addressed in the debate just 
described, at least that the state imposes a punishment that is expected or 
intended to make the wrongdoer’s life go less well. 
 
to punishment); David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1624–25 (2010); Adam J. 
Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 184 (2009) (arguing that 
accounting for subjective experience is necessary in justifying punishment); Dan Markel & Chad 
Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
907, 909 (2010) (arguing that subjective variations do not matter greatly to retributivism). 
 27.  Markel & Flanders, supra note 26, at 941. 
 28.  Kolber, supra note 26, at 218; Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 26, at 1069–70. 
 29.  Gray, supra note 26, at 1623; Kolber, supra note 26, at 184; Adam J. Kolber, Unintentional 
Punishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1, 6 (2012); Kenneth W. Simons, Retributivists Need Not and Should 
Not Endorse the Subjectivist Account of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 2 (2009); see also 
David Lewis, The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53, 59–63 (1989) 
(in examining the “moral luck” problem in how to punish attempts, stating that many aspects of how 
punishment differentially affects individuals necessarily creates a kind of “punishment lottery”). 
 30.  For discussion of the connection between desert and well-being, see SHELLY KAGAN, Moral 
Desert, in THE GEOMETRY OF DESERT 3–17 (2012). 
 31.  Mitchell N. Berman, Rehabilitating Retributivism, 32 LAW & PHIL. 83, 87 (2013) [hereinafter 
Berman, Rehabilitating Retributivism]. Indeed, for Berman the intentional infliction of suffering is the 
essential fact about punishment that gives rise to the requirement that punishment be justified, and thus 
to the grounds for all general theories of punishment. Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 
118 ETHICS 258, 266 (2008). 
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Without grounding a theory of retributive punishment in suffering, set-backs 
to interests or well-being, or other forms of deprivation, it is difficult to construct 
a distinctive and persuasive account of what it is that punishment must do in order 
to count as retributive. As soon as one begins to talk about making the wrongdoer 
think about her wrong, or change her behavior, or the like, one strays into the 
realm of mainstream instrumentalist punishment theory (reform and 
rehabilitation, specific deterrence, and the like).32 
Consider lines of theoretical argument that describe the purposes of 
punishment as more communicative than painful. Some who have been called 
“expressive retributivists” assert that “condemnation, instead of or in addition to 
hard treatment, is what the wrongdoer deserves.”33 Others who have been called, 
not always with precision, expressive theorists of punishment describe 
punishment as communicating the victim’s moral worth in relation to that of the 
offender (Jean Hampton, for example); as communicating to the offender the 
nature and implications of her offense so that she will internalize the moral 
matter (Antony Duff, for example); as speaking the morally true “language of 
condemnation, censure, and vindication” in response to crime’s false “language 
of dishonor and disrespect” (Stephen Garvey); or as communicating “certain 
messages of condemnation through coercive sanctions to the person most in need 
of hearing these messages: the offender” (Dan Markel).34 
Arguments such as these, based in the production of communicative effects, 
do not succeed in removing the necessity of actually or potentially experienced 
deprivation from the retributive punishment equation. These arguments are 
consequentialist, in the broad sense, in their concern with not only conveying 
meaning but having meaning internalized. In any event, they depend on the 
possibility of an affective subject of punishment, to whom condemnatory and 
similar messages can have meaning, and particularly meaning with impact on the 
subject’s emotions, beliefs, and self-understanding.35 
 
 32.  FEINBERG, supra note 16, at 81 (“Utility is not a desert basis for any deserved mode of treatment  
.  .  . to say ‘S deserves X because giving it to him would be in the public interest’ is simply to misuse the 
word ‘deserves.’”); see also Kip Schlegel, Desert, Retribution, and Corporate Criminality, 5 JUST. Q. 615, 
617–26 (carefully disentangling arguments about corporate punishment to distinguish retributive from 
consequentialist claims) (1988). 
 33.  Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 
1421 (2000). 
 34.  Id. at 1422–27; Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1820–21 
(1999); Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 
25–26 (2012). 
 35.  See, e.g., Garvey, supra note 34, at 1838 (explaining how Moore’s theory of retribution asks us 
to consider how the ideal serious offender would feel guilty and deserving of suffering and apply that 
desert to the question of how to treat the actual offender—to which Garvey adds the claim that the ideal 
offender would also desire to atone); Markel, supra note 34, at 28 (“By imposing the punishment upon a 
competent offender, we are able to communicate to him (and also express to others) our commitment to 
certain specific values of political morality.”); Markel & Flanders, supra note 26, at 910 (“[A] person 
selected for punishment must be a fit interlocutor for the communicative message of retributive 
punishment.”); Gideon Rosen, The Alethic Conception of Moral Responsibility, in THE NATURE OF 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY: NEW ESSAYS 65, 82 (Randolph Clarke et al. eds., 2015) (“[W]hat resentment 
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Some who have pursued retributive theory along these communicative lines, 
including Jean Hampton, have said that suffering through punishment is the 
mechanism by which the relevant retributive goal is pursued.36 Even if one would 
deny the necessity of punishment as suffering in favor of, for example, Dan 
Markel’s idea of punishment “as an attempt to communicate to the offender 
society’s condemnation by means of an objective good such as liberty,” one must 
explain how deprivations of this sort can count as “punishment” other than due 
to the deprivation involved in enduring them.37 
If one instead maintains that retributivism requires that a proportionate 
punishment be imposed on grounds such as “to balance the moral ledger,” “to 
answer one wrong with another,” as a matter of distributive fairness, as 
condemning the moral wrong of social free-riding, or the like, one does not quite 
reach the bottom of the matter.38 How is it that punishment of a wrongdoer could 
be equated with a wrong or serve to balance the weight of that wrong on a moral 
scale? Only by being a wrong of some sort itself. What kind of wrong could 
punishment be, if one sets aside matters of social costs and benefits? None other 
than the infliction of a deprivation upon the offender that must be “suffered,” 
even if it does not lead to actual suffering. 
Without at least the potential of the offender’s experience of deprivation, 
there could be no moral wrong to answer the wrongdoer’s wrong.  And as Jean 
Hampton argues, a “free rider” or “distributive justice” theory of retribution that 
justifies punishment as ensuring the fair allocation of benefits and burdens across 
society fails to account for retribution with the worst crimes, ones for which 
almost no non-offender would feel any cost in refraining from committing the 
crime.39 (When Hampton asserts that “retribution is actually a form of 
compensation to the victim,” her theory similarly leaves a gap with respect to 
crimes based on diffused theories of victimization—a particularly common 
phenomenon in corporate crime.40) 
 
wants is not simply that the agent suffer, but that she suffer in recognizing what she has done, in being 
brought face to face with the harm that she has caused or risked, the disrespect she showed, and so on.”). 
 36.  Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS 
AND MERCY 111, 123 (1988). 
 37.  Markel & Flanders, supra note 26, at 911. Markel and Flanders appear to concede this. Id. at 
946 (“[T]he goal is not to cause the offender unvariegated suffering, but to communicate to the offender 
the wrongness of his action, using particular deprivations to signal that condemnation.”). 
 38.  See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm under the Code, 
and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 725, 735–36 (1988); Hampton, supra note 36, at 125–26; 
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 477 (1968); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retributivism, 
Moral Education, and the Liberal State, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1985, at 3, 6–7; see also Duff, 
supra note 19, at 26–27 (summarizing such arguments and their critics). 
 39.  Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA 
L. REV. 1659, 1660 (1992); see Morris, supra note 38, at 477–78. An additional problem with the 
application of Morris’ retributive theory to corporations is that he argues in terms of the offender’s 
“right” to be treated as a moral agent by receiving his desert. When we speak about any rights of 
corporations, we speak about legal and procedural rights, not human rights. 
 40.  Hampton, supra note 39, at 1698. 
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Retributive punishment therefore requires at least the potential for a 
wrongdoer to endure deprivation.41 As a corollary, there can be no “negative” 
retributivist objection to excess punishment where there can be no such 
experience to endure. Thus, in the absence of wrongdoers’ experiential capacity, 
punishment can neither be justified nor restrained on the basis of retributivist 
argument. 
B. Corporate Wrongdoing 
Probably the most common objection to punishing corporations on the basis 
of retributive justifications is, in general terms, that corporations are not people 
and therefore cannot be blameworthy.42 This claim—that corporations 
categorically lack moral agency—runs contrary to widespread social practice and 
is not persuasive. 
Start with the question of what is required in order to have a blameworthy 
subject in terms of punishment theory, that is, a wrongdoer deserving of 
punishment. There must be an act and the act must be morally wrong in one or 
more ways sufficient to justify criminal punishment.43 Corporations, as 
phenomena in the world, plainly do things—that is, produce outcomes—some of 
which are deeply concerning on dimensions such as harm and risk that amply 
justify discussion about legal response.44 Indeed, we live in a world pervaded by 
the activities of corporations as well as laws and legal procedures that are 
responsive to those activities. 
To argue that “corporate acts” are not a distinct phenomenon from the 
individual actions of the people (some of them often independently blameworthy 
as wrongdoers, but many of them frequently not so) whose behavior contributed 
 
 41.  It is an interesting question whether people can be made to endure deprivations when they are 
no longer alive, as in the situation of posthumous harm to reputation. See Ben Bradley, Well-Being and 
Death, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF WELL-BEING 320, 325–326 (Guy Fletcher 
ed., 2016) (discussing the possibility of posthumous harm to a person’s well-being). I do not see this 
problem as having implications for theories of corporate punishment. Any theory of posthumous effects 
on well-being would seem to depend on the subject having once lived. 
 42.  Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1359, 1373 (2009) (“The word ‘criminal’ has its distinctive significance, however, because this 
word means blameworthy. Someone who applies this word to objects and entities that are not 
blameworthy uses the label falsely.”). 
 43.  See Hampton, supra note 39, at 1662 (“A wrongful harm or loss only comes from wrongful 
conduct by an agent thought to be culpable.”); Husak, supra note 23, at 983 (“[A] state of affairs cannot 
be identified as a harm (in the relevant sense) without reference to morality. Conduct produces harm to 
others when it infringes their rights. Therefore, conduct that does not infringe anyone’s rights, however 
unwanted or undesirable it may be, simply does not cause harm in the sense that renders it eligible for 
proscription. For each of these reasons, a harm theorist, no less than a legal moralist, requires a 
conception of morality to get his theory of criminalization off the ground.”); William S. Laufer & Alan 
Strudler, Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1285, 
1290 (2000) (“Paradigmatically, one deserves punishment only for engaging in a wrongful act while 
having a relevant culpable state of mind.”). 
 44.  See Sara Sun Beale, A Response to the Critics of Corporate Criminal Liability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1481, 1483–84 (2009) (“Modern corporations not only wield virtually unprecedented power, but 
they do so in a fashion that often causes serious harm to both individuals and to society as a whole.”). 
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to the corporate act is not persuasive. Furthermore, it is not material to doctrine 
whether one calls this problem one of “action,” “corporate acts,” or “collective 
actions,” or whether this problem matches the way traditional criminal law 
doctrine deals with the “act requirement.” Law has developed functional tools 
for ascribing the results of collective activity within corporations to corporate 
entities, including agency doctrines such as respondeat superior that control in 
both criminal prosecutions and many civil actions.45 
Acts can be ascribed to corporations, and it makes perfect sense to do so. 
Modern industrial society would be unintelligible without a coherent moral and 
linguistic framework for attributing the oil spill to the energy company, the 
overdose deaths to the pharmaceutical firm, the defective air bag to the 
automobile parts manufacturer, and so on.46 Of course these events result from 
the actions of individual persons. But they can be coherently described, much less 
occur as they do, only if there is such a phenomenon as group action (the whole) 
distinct from a collection of individual actions (the sum of the parts).47 Anyone 
who has spent time studying scandals, compliance, corporate culture, 
management, and corporate governance would agree that it is sophistic to 
maintain that corporations do not act because they are not people. 
In retributive theory, action alone is not sufficient to justify criminal liability. 
Actions must be morally wrong to warrant punishment. Some might argue that 
actions themselves can be sufficiently morally wrong to warrant punishment in 
the absence of culpability—that some instances of the law punishing on the basis 
of strict liability are not just means of influencing behavior but also of blaming 
for the imposition of serious harms. But that would be an uncommon view.48 As 
a matter of both positive and negative retributivism, it is generally agreed that 
 
 45.  See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R., Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492–93 (1909); United 
States v. Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78, 82 (10th Cir. 1975); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (AM. 
LAW INST., Official Draft 1985); Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 370–71 
(2003). 
 46.  See Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and 
Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1149 (1982) (“When people blame corporations  .  .  . they are 
condemning the fact that people within the organization collectively failed to avoid the offense to which 
corporate blame attaches.”). 
 47.  See PETER CANE, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW AND MORALITY 41–42 (2002) (examining “[t]he 
importance of concepts of group legal responsibility”); D.E. Cooper, Collective Responsibility, in 
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY: FIVE DECADES OF DEBATE IN THEORETICAL AND APPLIED ETHICS 
35, 35–36 (Larry May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991) (describing “Collective Responsibility” and 
“Individual Responsibility” as distinct concepts); CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY 112, 144–45, 192 
(2000) (discussing the relationship between collective action and individual action); LARRY MAY, THE 
MORALITY OF GROUPS 65 (1987) (arguing that corporate organization and procedures “combine and 
change the intentional states of key members of the organization so as to result in purposive behavior for 
the group”); LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY 75 (1992) [hereinafter MAY, SHARING 
RESPONSIBILITY] (stating that individuals “act differently in groups than they would on their own” due 
to the relationships between group members). 
 48.  Even a strongly “harm-based” (as opposed to “intent-based”) account of moral responsibility, 
see Ashworth, supra note 38, at 735–36, depends at least implicitly on a conception of how it is that one 
deserves to be blamed for the hurt one’s actions cause others, a conception that must include some 
account of the harm-doer’s failings as a moral agent capable of deliberation. 
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there must be moral blameworthiness in an action to justify punishment, and that 
blameworthiness generally follows from cognitive culpability, that is, from the 
beliefs, attitudes, or choices that gave rise to the actions in question.49 Without 
sufficient blameworthiness in the form of morally faulty cognition, there can be 
no desert of punishment. 
This is where arguments against corporate retributivism have usually staked 
their claim. Independent of questions involving the doctrinal particulars of mens 
rea, punishment theory generally holds that morally wrongful choice (a decision 
to impose unjustified harm or risk of harm on another, for example) is the type 
of culpability that is necessary to any argument for blameworthiness.50 This 
condition can be stated in various ways, but that is a serviceable approximation 
of what modern punishment theory has established in place of, or to build upon, 
the criminal law’s ancient requirement of “general mens rea,” or what is 
sometimes called the Blackstonian idea of an “evil” or “wicked” mind.”51 
The most common argument one hears against corporate retributivism is that 
corporations do not have minds, so cannot make wrongful choices, and thus 
cannot be morally blameworthy.52 Corporations therefore cannot deserve 
punishment. As with the question of corporate action, the problem is theoretical, 
not doctrinal. The law of corporate criminal liability has a number of options for 
locating corporate mens rea, including of course the vicarious liability approach 
of respondeat superior doctrine followed by federal law in the U.S. The doctrinal 
problem has produced a lively and still productive literature,53 but that debate is 
about implementation. 
The question prior to doctrine is whether it is coherent to blame a corporation 
for the “choices” it makes when corporate actions, at least in cases involving firms 
of any substantial size, are the product of the thinking and deliberations of 
multiple persons. An affirmative answer is straightforwardly established in three 
steps.54 
 
 49.  E.g., Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Culpable Acts of Risk Creation, 5 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 375, 377–379 (2008); MOORE, supra note 13, at 191–93; Moore, supra note 26, at 30, 41–42. 
 50.  See supra note 49. 
 51.  See United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (referring to the 
historical requirement of an “evil intent” in criminal law); see also Kahler v. Kansas, 240 S.Ct. 1021, 1039–
45 (2020) (Breyer, J, dissenting) (arguing that, based on historical evidence, “[a] defendant who, due to 
mental illness, lacks sufficient mental capacity to be held morally responsible for his actions cannot be 
found guilty of a crime”). 
 52.  E.g., Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They 
Do, 2 BUS. & PRO. ETHICS J. 1, 12 (1983) (“All that a corporation’s members should have to suffer is the 
blame and punishment consequent on their own moral responsibility; to make them suffer the 
punishment that should have been levied on the corporate structure would be to punish them twice. But 
in fact it is not possible to impose blame or punishment upon an organizational structure without having 
that blame or punishment fall on the shoulders of the corporation’s members  .  .  . . These members are 
therefore being unjustly forced to bear the punishment for another entity’s moral responsibility.”). 
 53.  See, e.g., Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability, 82 
IND. L.J. 411 (2007). 
 54.  For a book-length development of the argument, see CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP 
AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS (2011). 
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First, if collective human decision making is an actual phenomenon—which 
seems incontrovertible—then it is coherent to ascribe responsibility to groups for 
bad decisions. Second, group responsibility is a distinct phenomenon from 
individual responsibility, that is, one communicates something different or 
additional when one blames a group for a wrong decision than when one blames 
members of that group for making wrong decisions or having a role in the group 
decision. Third, if group blame is warranted, then it is sensible, in an instance of 
group decision making within a corporation, to select the corporation as the 
object of that blame.55 
Perhaps the last point is the most debatable of the three. But—except maybe 
in exceptional corporate cases—it would be hard to find a better representation 
of the group than the corporation, just as one would point to the gang, the family, 
the team, the clique, the band, and the like, for blame in other group contexts. In 
other words, it would be odd, in a case of blameworthy group decision making 
within a corporation, to say something like, “Well any legal blame must be 
directed at the corporation because it is the only legal person in this picture other 
than the individuals, but moral blame really belongs with a different, non-legal 
entity like ‘the people who work at the corporation.’” 
Thus, the widespread contemporary social practice of blaming corporations 
for producing wrongs is analytically sound.56 If retributive theory cannot be 
applied coherently to corporations, it is not because corporations cannot be 
blameworthy and thus deserving of punishment. 
C. Corporate Punishment 
It is at the point of punishment—the deliverance of what is deserved—that 
retributivism loses purchase on corporate criminality. Joel Feinberg, in his 
famous theorizing of the concept of desert, puts the matter thusly: 
What are the various kinds of treatment that persons deserve from other persons? They 
are varied, but they have at least one thing in common: they are generally “affective” in 
character, that is, favored or disfavored, pursued or avoided, pleasant or unpleasant. 
The deserved object must be something generally regarded with favor or disfavor even 
if, in some particular case, it is regarded with indifference by a person said to deserve it. 
If we were all perfect stoics, if no event were ever more or less pleasing to us than any 
other, there would be no use for the concept of desert.57 
Or, as Mitchell Berman puts it: 
[T]o a rough first approximation, what wrongdoers deserve on account of their 
wrongdoing is that their lives go less well. To a second pass  .  .  . [a]n individual who 
engages in wrongdoing deserves that her life go less well than it otherwise would have 
 
 55.  See id. at 153–63 (expanding on the argument that “we have every reason to hold group agents 
responsible” for their actions, not just the individuals that compose those groups). 
 56.  For extended argument in support of both this claim and the general proposition of group 
responsibility, see the ample legal and philosophical literatures. E.g., CANE, supra note 47; Benjamin 
Ewing, The Structure of Tort Law, Revisited: The Problem of Corporate Responsibility, 8 J. TORT L. 1, 
20–28 (2015) (discussing how corporations can be morally and attributively responsible for torts); KUTZ, 
supra note 47; LIST & PETTIT, supra note 54; MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 47. 
 57.  FEINBERG, supra note 16, at 61. 
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gone, and less well in proportion to the blameworthiness of her wrongdoing, and that 
she understands that it goes less well as a consequence of her wrongdoing.58 
This is where the idea that “corporations are not people” causes punishment 
theory constructed for the problem of punishing individuals to fail when applied 
to corporations.59 In terms of the discussion described above, if a corporation 
cannot experience hardship because it is not a sentient being—either actually or 
in any analogous way that could accommodate the concept of enduring painful 
or unwelcome treatment—then it does not matter whether one is an “objectivist” 
or a “subjectivist” about retributive punishment. Corporations do not experience 
pain or suffering differentially or occasionally. They simply do not feel anything. 
One might assert that while corporations cannot experience pain, they are 
projects that can go well or poorly in the world depending in part on what is done 
to them, including by the state. Thus, one might say, corporations can deserve to 
have their affairs go less well and their affairs can be made to go less well as a 
consequence of this desert. 
In terms of the discussion of retributive theory above, one can, at a first pass, 
plausibly say that corporations can have their interests set back. Corporations, 
after all, do have interests, at least legal and economic ones. In addition, 
corporations can possibly have their well-being reduced—but only if the concept 
of well-being applies to legal entities, a matter that well-being theory has not fully 
addressed and that appears doubtful under the field’s more persuasive 
conceptions of well-being, including even theories that do not depend on a 
hedonic conception of well-being.60 
But without affective capacity, a corporation can feel or experience nothing 
when its affairs have gone less well, and thus in no sense can it be said that 
retribution has been imposed, received, or even sensibly directed at the 
corporation.61 Something major may have happened to the corporation that may 
produce consequences, including instrumentally desirable ones. But at the point 
 
 58.  Berman, Rehabilitating Retributivism, supra note 31, at 87–89. 
 59.  See Alex Sarch, Skepticism About Corporate Punishment Revisited, in THE PALGRAVE 
HANDBOOK OF APPLIED ETHICS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 213, 217 (Larry Alexander & Kimberly 
Kessler Ferzan eds., 2019) (“Suppose we grant that in convicting and fining the corporation, we are not 
engaging in real punishment. At best, it is a bad imitation of punishment—call it punishment*. Why is 
this intrinsically bad? Assuming, as we are, that there are weighty consequentialist reasons for 
punishment*, is conceptual confusion a substantial hurdle to adopting or continuing with that practice?”). 
 60.  See, e.g., Willem van der Deijl, The Sentience Argument for Experientialism About Welfare, PHIL. 
STUD. (2020), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11098-020-01427-w.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
37HL-4HBW] (concluding that “the most plausible and intuitive account suggests that all and only 
sentient beings have wellbeing” and defining sentience as “the capacity to have phenomenological 
consciousness, i.e., the capacity to have experiences”). See generally Stephen M. Campbell, The Concept 
of Well-Being, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF WELL-BEING, supra note 41, at 
402. 
 61.  Interestingly, Jean Hampton, in one of her foundational writings on her original theory of 
retribution, discusses its application to corporations (using the Ford Pinto scandal and litigation) as an 
illustration of the theory of an offender’s low moral valuation of victims, without considering the question 
of whether and how a corporation (Ford in this case) could be a subject of retributive treatment. 
Hampton, supra note 39, at 1689. 
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of punishment’s imposition, retribution has not occurred. Instead, punishment 
has merely contributed to the sum of the inputs to a corporation’s existence that 
determine how the institutional project will fare as it goes forward—in success, 
failure, or mediocrity.62 
This would hold true even if it were somehow possible to imprison a 
corporation. From a retributive point of view, the problem is not that 
corporations are too big to jail but rather that they are too inhuman to feel. To 
cripple a corporation with, for example, a massive fine and to say, “Take that, 
Acme Corp, you got what you deserved. How do you like them apples?” is no 
more coherent than, after kicking the chair over which one has stumbled in the 
night, telling the chair that the blow better have hurt. To use a different analogy, 
attempting to mete out retribution to a corporation might be akin to carrying out 
the death penalty for retributive reasons on a person who is insane and incapable 
of understanding what is happening.63 
A further implication of this analysis is that it makes no sense to talk about 
negative retributivism with corporate punishment. Even in a predominantly 
instrumental program of corporate punishment, retribution plays no logical role 
in constraining such punishment.64 Of course, few who have explored corporate 
retribution have done so out of worry about punishing corporations that are not 
blameworthy. But there has been substantial discourse about the unfairness of 
corporate criminal prosecutions with respect to certain individuals, especially 
investors and employees (the so-called collateral consequences problem in 
corporate crime). There may be good instrumental reasons to worry about effects 
on such persons—as well as perhaps the sort of deontological worries that can be 
relevant to thinking about the effects of criminal punishment on third parties such 
as family members. As important as such considerations might be in the 
corporate context, however, they do not implicate negative retributivism’s 
concern with state imposition of undeserved deprivations on a subject of criminal 
punishment. 
III 
THE ARGUMENT FROM POLITICS 
What is left, then, of the idea of retribution as a justification for corporate 
criminal liability? If one attends to public and political discourse about corporate 
crime, as well to elements of the academic literature, one often hears versions of 
the claim that blameworthy corporations should be punished with retribution in 
mind because people, often very large portions of the population, correctly form 
 
 62.  Cf. Markel & Flanders, supra note 26, at 932 (“[T]o punish someone is to say that flouting the 
law cannot simply be fixed by compensation or an acknowledgement of causation alone.”). 
 63.  See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405–10 (1986) (holding that the Eighth Amendment bars 
the imposition of the death penalty on an insane prisoner). Thanks to Kim Ferzan for raising this point. 
 64.  See generally Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815 
(2007) (exploring the possible applications of retributive theory to the decisions of various actors at stages 
of the criminal justice process). 
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beliefs that corporations deserve punishment for their serious wrongs.65 Failing 
to deliver that desert, on this claim, deprives people of something they have 
demanded and are entitled to. Delivering it provides the public with satisfaction 
that blameworthy corporations have received their due—which could be useful 
in various ways, and could be the right thing to do regardless of whether doing so 
produces benefits.66 
In relation to the argument that imposing retribution on corporations is not 
possible, this claim is a non sequitur rather than a rejoinder. No matter how 
blameworthy a corporation might be, and no matter how strenuously the public 
might maintain that a corporation deserves punishment as a result, if a 
corporation cannot experience retribution, then retribution cannot be imposed. 
The actual, and usually unarticulated, claim here is that punishing 
corporations in the name of retribution—even if retributive punishment of 
corporations is not possible—is instrumentally beneficial. This is an argument 
that falls, roughly speaking, into a long line of scholarship concerned with the 
utility of retribution and with the expressive function of criminal law.67 This rich 
theoretical tradition dates at least to the work of James Fitzjames Stephen in the 
nineteenth century. 68 
This is a sensible line of argument, indeed one I have defended at length in 
the context of corporate criminal liability.69 To truncate my own instrumental 
version of this consequentialist line of argument, the practice of blaming legal 
entities through criminal legal treatment can be a particularly potent way of 
causing individuals engaged in group projects to internalize the significance and 
origins of the most serious institutional failures and alter group conduct to reduce 
future incidence of like failures. 
Arguments in this tradition do not help establish the claim that corporate 
prosecutions are justified on the grounds that they fulfill a retributive moral 
imperative. Seeing this—and fully incorporating the point into the literature on 
corporate crime—is much more than a matter of accuracy in terminology. It does 
no great harm (except perhaps to the sensitivities of academic theorists) for 
people to go around bemoaning the failure to adequately punish corporations for 
their terrible moral awfulness, and so on. But it can do considerable harm to the 
 
 65.  E.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
609, 618–22 (1998). 
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urgent policy debate about corporate crime, and the connection of that debate to 
useful theoretical work by scholars, for people to fail to follow through on the 
meaning and significance of demands for corporate retribution. 
Those demands, under scrutiny, should lead to more careful and thus more 
useful analysis of what is to be accomplished through corporate criminal liability. 
Otherwise, they are conclusory assertions—dead ends that can only stand in the 
way of progress on matters of great public import and theoretical difficulty. 
IV 
CORPORATE PROSECUTIONS 
So, what is it that corporate prosecutions do? This is of course a familiar 
question for scholars. The foregoing analysis of the matter of the retributive 
function in criminal punishment may help with the enduring search for clarity in 
answering the question. 
A. The Justice Department Program 
On June 16, 1999, the DOJ for the first time consecrated its by then modern, 
growing program of enforcing the doctrine of corporate criminal liability, a legal 
rule that had been extant in American law for over a century. The founding 
document was a memorandum titled “Bringing Criminal Charges Against 
Corporations,” which attached a set of principles for “Federal Prosecution of 
Corporations.”70 The memorandum was signed by then Deputy Attorney 
General Eric Holder. It became known as the “Holder Memo,” but the 
prosecution principles were enshrined in the Justice Manual, a quasi-regulatory 
document that for many decades was known as the United States Attorneys 
Manual.71 
The DOJ has amended its principles for corporate prosecutions many times 
since the Holder Memo.72 Some of those changes have substantially altered the 
dynamics of investigation and settlement in corporate enforcement. The DOJ, 
however, has never wavered from the foundational theory of corporate 
prosecution set out in the introductory language of the Holder Memo: that the 
prosecution of corporations can advance social welfare by helping to reduce the 
incidence of corporate crime and that a federal prosecutor should assess whether 
to charge a corporation based on a thorough balancing of the costs and benefits 
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of prosecution.73 Other than references to vague concepts such as “the nature and 
seriousness of the offense,” the DOJ’s policy does not explicitly direct 
prosecutors to pursue the objective of corporate retribution. 
In the two decades since the Holder Memo, the DOJ has developed a 
thoroughgoingly instrumental program of corporate criminal enforcement. This 
focus largely explains the development of DPAs and NPAs as the prevalent 
means of resolving corporate criminal actions and the heavy outsourcing of the 
investigative function to compliance operations and private lawyers working for 
corporations.74 
Criticisms of the DOJ’s enforcement program have been persistent 
throughout the past two decades, and have grown in the wake of the financial 
crisis of 2008. Indeed, Holder himself, when later serving as Attorney General in 
the Obama Administration, sustained heavy media fire for his handling of 
settlements with the large financial institutions that dominated the mortgage-
backed securities industry.75 
The lion’s share of criticism of the DOJ has been instrumentally oriented: 
that, contrary to its aspirations, the DOJ is not achieving effective deterrence of 
corporate crime because, for example, federal prosecutors fail to charge enough 
(and senior enough) individuals, fail to impose sufficiently costly fines on 
companies, and are unwilling to pursue corporate cases all the way to trial even 
at the cost of potentially putting firms out of business.76 But an oft-repeated 
theme in the criticisms has been that DPAs and NPAs do not treat corporate 
crime seriously enough, that corporations are “let off too easy” when they avoid 
convictions, and that the DOJ has not been willing to treat “corporate criminals” 
(possibly meaning both people and firms) with the harshness that the federal 
system routinely inflicts on street offenders.77 
There is a clear retributive color to these criticisms. When the DOJ appears 
to pull punches in corporate cases, especially in high profile cases of extensive 
and noteworthy harm, it leaves the impression that amply blameworthy 
organizations are not getting what they deserve. What justice requires has not 
been fully delivered and thus prosecutors have failed in their duties. 
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In light of the analysis in this Article, this failure, and the persistence of 
frustration and criticism, are inevitable because corporations can be blameworthy 
but cannot be punished retributively. There will always be a gap between what 
corporations deserve and what they receive.78 This is only one of many ways in 
which our fraught relationship with the large modern business corporation leaves 
us confused and unsatisfied.79 
B.  Why Indictments and Convictions Might Matter 
It is predictable, of course, that the public would be dissatisfied with the 
routine treatment of corporate crime using a legal vehicle called 
“nonprosecution” or “deferred prosecution.” Especially against the background 
of mass incarceration and widespread and visible procedural inequalities in 
criminal justice, few things could be less attractive than pursuing major corporate 
crimes—which, as in the opioid scandal, can involve especially aggravated moral 
blameworthiness—with less prosecutorial action than is routinely used to pursue 
minor street crime. 
It is thus not surprising that in recent years the DOJ, in obvious reaction to 
public criticism, has pursued more resolutions with corporations involving guilty 
pleas, even as NPAs and DPAs have continued to dominate. Corporate pleas and 
convictions have been particularly evident in more noteworthy cases, such as the 
BP oil spill, the Walmart foreign bribery matter, and the LIBOR and Forex 
trading affairs involving financial institutions that had previously resolved 
criminal cases through NPAs. Fifteen years ago, conventional wisdom held 
(mistakenly, it turned out) that reputable corporations could not survive 
indictment and that the prosecution of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm had 
proved the folly of prosecutors pursuing corporate convictions.80 
A conundrum in the modern practice of corporate criminal liability is why 
conviction for corporations should matter when the criminal process cannot 
impose sanctions on corporations that are different in kind, or even theoretically 
in degree, than civil lawsuits and regulatory enforcement actions.81 A common 
answer is that criminal convictions carry the potential of crippling delicensing and 
debarment sanctions, collateral consequences that may not be available under 
civil regimes. That is undoubtedly the major reason convictions matter to firms 
and their lawyers. But it seems unlikely that public dissatisfaction with DPAs and 
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NPAs has been grounded in the relatively obscure matter of debarment rules 
under federal law. 
A more plausible explanation for the significance of pleas and convictions is 
that they express legal consecration of the corporation’s wrongdoing and 
blameworthiness to a degree that DPAs and NPAs cannot.82 Even though such 
agreements typically require companies to admit the facts of wrongdoing, they 
do not require companies to say “guilty” in court and they do not involve an 
independent judicial officer entering a judgment of conviction on a court’s docket 
and performing the ritual of imposing a “sentence” (as opposed to the parties’ 
agreement to similar sanctions by the terms of a contract). 
This expression may well matter to the public, and thus to the DOJ, because 
it treats corporate crime with the sort of condemnation that seems deserved. 
Doing so may (or may not) have social welfare benefits—a question that warrants 
continued exploration. But whatever the conviction and sentencing of a 
corporation is, it is not, and cannot be, retributive. It must be justified according 
to the consequences that follow from it. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Retributivism is, after all, a theory of punishment—not, or not ultimately, a 
theory of responsibility. Retributive punishment is punishment that causes, or is 
at least meant to cause, its subject to experience and endure pain, suffering, or a 
deprivation of substantial rights or interests. Without at least the expectation of 
such an experience, punishment cannot affect its subject in a manner that could 
be deserved on account of the moral wrong that is a crime. Because corporations 
cannot experience such pain, suffering, or deprivations, they cannot be punished 
on retributive grounds. 
“Corporate retribution” is thus no such thing. To the extent that use of this 
terminology persists in the discussion of corporate crime, it is a placeholder for a 
line of consequentialist argument. Analysis of corporate crime should continue 
to pursue the difficult question of whether and how it is justified and beneficial 
to engage in blame-based projects of prosecuting and convicting corporations. 
Important puzzles remain to be solved about the use of criminal law’s potent 
moral tools against institutions rather than people. Meanwhile, it is a confusion 
and a distraction to continue to discuss corporate criminality as if it were anything 
other than a rich instrumental problem. This Article has been a call to stop doing 
so. 
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